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ABSTRACT
Professor Michael Newton advocates for the International Criminal Court (ICC)
to proactively adopt positive complementarity, rather than continue the apparent
trend toward supranational superiority that endangers the principle of
complementarity and the ICC itself This article explores Newton's concerns over
potential ICC hostility to state action in several areas. After closely examining ICC
practice and offering alternate interpretations of allegedly problematic positions
taken by the ICC, this article concludes that the evidence is mixed While some
ICC practice supports Newton's concerns, it is not clear that the most troublesome
positions will apply outside the narrow context of self-referring, inactive states.
Where states profess no desire to take action against the accused, it is difficult to
extrapolate from ICC decisions on admissibility, statements on gravity, or other
issues related to complementarity. Nonetheless, there are sufficient indications of
apparent hostility or indifference to state sovereignty to raise concerns. The article
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therefore explores Newton's exhortation of deference to national proceedings. It
identifies the complex questions, procedural and substantive, that arise when
implementing deference to state proceedings, whether prosecutorial or otherwise.
It concludes with brief suggestions on how the 1CC might respond to Newton's
identification of troubling trends and his challenge to embrace positive
complementarity.
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I. Introduction
Professor Michael Newton advocates for a more cooperative and constructive
approach to complementarity in his thought-provoking article, The
Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?2 He
contends that current practice at the International Criminal Court (ICC) has strayed
from the fundamental principle that national jurisdictions would have primacy over
the investigation and prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.3 The ICC would step in only when necessary to end impunity, such as
when the state failed to act or acted in bad faith. Under the Rome Statute creating
the court, a case is inadmissible based on proper state investigation, prosecution, or
decision not to prosecute; prior trial for the same conduct; or insufficient gravity.4
Newton asserts that the "rhetoric ... related to complementarity has subtly shifted
from a tone of cooperation and consultation to one of competition." 5 In particular,
he singles out the practice of various organs of the ICC related to complementarity,
especially article 17's admissibility provisions. Newton contends these troubling
trends undermine political support for the ICC and therefore should be addressed
in order to preserve the long-term viability of the ICC.
First, Newton contends that a Security Council referral of a situation renders
subsequent cases admissible automatically. 6 Second, he argues that discretionary
2. Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or
Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L 115 (2010).
3. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, July 17,
1998 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime against
aggression if and when a definition of the crime is agreed upon and adopted as an
amendment to the statute. See id. 2.
4. Article 17(1) provides that a case is inadmissible if:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17.
5. Newton, supra note 2, at 163.
6. Id. at 131.
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charging is problematic on several grounds relating to the domestic
implementation of ICC crimes. 7 He asserts the ICC should "recognize the
discretion of the domestic authorities regarding the scope and form of the domestic
charges."g If the state is acting in good faith, the ICC should defer; under article
17, the case before the ICC would be inadmissible because the state is
investigating, prosecuting, or has investigated or prosecuted already. But if the ICC
adopts a rigid and narrow approach, it could reject as inadequate any state
proceeding that does not exactly match the charges that would be brought under
the Rome Statute.9 In such a scenario, state "decisions to pursue any other charges
against an accused other than those that conform precisely to those selected by the
ICC prosecutor could be automatically construed as manifesting unwillingness to
prosecute within the meaning of the admissibility criteria"'1° -meaning that the
case would be admissible at the ICC regardless of the state proceedings.
Third, Newton contends that the Rome Statute's "gravity" requirement" has
been used to override or at least minimize other admissibility provisions. 12 As he
puts it, "[e]arly indications.., reveal disquieting indications that the ICC may tend
to use the gravity threshold as a backdrop for making admissibility of a particular
case a subsidiary principle to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.' 3 Finally,
Newton asserts that current practice indicates the ICC is erroneously assuming that
a state self-referral of a situation effectively waives any subsequent right to
challenge admissibility on the basis of state proceedings. 14
Newton concludes that the hostility toward states illustrated by the ICC's
practice to date will undermine the ICC by eroding its political support and
discouraging non-state parties from joining. By contrast, "a framework of positive
complementarity and cooperative synergy is the only feasible way to ensure long
term vitality for the ICC as an autonomous international institution."' 5 As a result,
"the ICC should work with states to enhance their domestic capacity and defer to
domestic investigations or prosecutions in any feasible conditions."' 16 Such
7. Id. at PartV.A.
8. Id. at 150.
9. See id. at 157.
10. Id.
11. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(d).
12. See Newton, supra note 2, at 157.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 162.
15. Id. at 164.
16. Id.
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deference might be implemented by a Commission of Experts on
Complementarity, by another mechanism adopted through the Assembly of States
Parties, or by amendment to the statute. 17 Whatever the mechanism, the ICC
should "defer to the good faith reasoning of domestic officials applying the law of
the sovereign, even where the form of the domestic charges varies from the
prosecutorial preferences" of the ICC.18
Others have advocated for the type of cooperative approach to complementarity
supported by Newton.19 Newton situates his critique within current practice at the
ICC, referring to prosecutorial statements and court decisions related to the
admissibility or gravity of cases. The evidence, however, seems mixed. At the
least, there are competing plausible interpretations of the facts to date that call into
question whether ICC hostility to state action is the inevitable conclusion.
On some points, such as the treatment of cases coming under a Security Council
referral, the practice to date seems to contradict Newton's position that the ICC is
not evaluating admissibility, as discussed in Part II, infra. Yet the ICC does seem
to set the bar high in assessing state proceedings regarding the "person and
conduct" test for admissibility. This leads to difficulties in evaluating state
investigations of ICC crimes, as described in Part III, infra. With regard to the
definition of gravity, the Appeals Chamber has pulled back from the most
controversial position of the Pre-Trial Chamber, as explained in Part IV, infra.
Moreover, the statements of the Prosecutor, concerning gravity and case selection,
can be interpreted as a strategy to counter accusations of favoritism. Nonetheless,
the most recent admissibility proceedings relating to Uganda and the case of
Germain Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) can be
interpreted to support Newton's concerns about a purist application of the Rome
Statute's admissibility provisions, particularly with regard to the self-referrals
discussed in Part V, infra.
On balance, the attitude of the ICC can appear to be at odds with the desire to
encourage-and perhaps aid-states to prosecute international crimes when they
are willing and able to do so. Yet it is difficult to extrapolate from much of the
17. Michael Newton, Panel Remarks at Santa Clara Journal of International Law Symposium,
The Future of International Criminal Justice (Mar. 13-14, 2009).
18. Newton, supra note 2, at 164.
19. See, e.g., William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 53 (2008) (arguing for proactive complementarity, where the ICC cooperates with states
to encourage and perhaps assist state prosecution of international crimes).
The Practice of the International Criminal Court
current practice because of the context: self-referring states that do not intend to
take action against the accused. Language that may seem troubling in a vacuum
might never be applied in the context of genuine state action. The fears of Newton
might not come to pass. Nevertheless, the fact that attentive scholars and defense
counsel interpret the current practice as hostile to state action is in itself
problematic and should be addressed. Part VI, infra, explores Newton's proposal
for increased deference to state proceedings with an eye toward raising issues for
future consideration in developing mechanisms and standards for such deference.
It offers one example of substantive guidelines for deferring to state action to
highlight the complex issues raised by a deferential ICC approach: issues that are
magnified if the state action takes the form of nonprosecutorial alternative justice
mechanisms.
II. Security Council Referral
Newton contends that the obligation of member states to follow decisions of the
United Nations Security Council "effectively nullifies the right of
complementarity., 20 While states should not use complementarity "as a weapon"
21
to obstruct investigations of the ICC, it does not seem to follow that a state subject
to a Security Council referral cannot invoke article 17 admissibility to challenge
ICC jurisdiction, at least where the referral is silent regarding the issue.22 Even if
Newton is correct in theory,23 ICC practice to date regarding the Security Council's
one referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan seems to contradict the assertion.
Both the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) have considered
admissibility.
20. Newton, supra note 2, at 131.
21. Id.
22. The Security Council referral does not address whether Sudan is barred from asserting
jurisdiction over the same person and conduct; it does encourage the ICC to "support
international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human
rights and combat impunity in Darfur." S.C. Res. 1593, T 4, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar.
31, 2005).
23. The accuracy of Newton's interpretation of the UN Charter is beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion, see, for example, JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDIcTioNs: THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY 237-45 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) (questioning Newton's
conclusions regarding this issue as put forth in Michael A. Newton, Comparative
Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 20 (2001)).
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For example, in the arrest warrant decision regarding the accused from Sudan,
Ali Kushayb and Ahmad Harun, the PTC examines the national proceedings
(encompassing both the person and the conduct, which is the subject of the case
before the court) against Ali Kushayb in particular.24 It concludes, based on
evidence and assertions from the Prosecutor, that the case against both appears to
be admissible without prejudice to a subsequent challenge to admissibility under
article 19.2 5 In the more recent decision regarding the arrest warrant against
Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, the PTC declines to address admissibility-
not because it was irrelevant due to the Security Council referral, but because it
was not raised by the Prosecutor or the facts. 26 Of course, this does not mean that
the ICC will necessarily defer if an admissibility challenge is brought by Sudan or
the accused in the future. As discussed infra Part III, the ICC has interpreted article
17 to require very specific state proceedings in order to establish state action
barring ICC prosecution. Regardless, the ICC practice to date does not seem to
comport with Newton's assertion that a Security Council referral renders cases
automatically admissible.
III. Domestic Implementation of ICC Crimes
In general, a case is inadmissible: if the state is investigating, prosecuting, or
has made a decision not to prosecute, unless it is unwilling or unable genuinely to
do so; if the person has already been tried for the conduct; or if the case is not of
sufficient gravity. 27 Newton raises the issue of charging as it relates to state
investigation or prosecution in several contexts. It can be divided into three
categories: (1) where the state has failed to implement the Rome Statute into
domestic law, and therefore can charge only ordinary crimes; (2) where the state
has implemented the Rome Statute but adopted narrower definitions of genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity; and (3) where the state has adopted
broader definitions of ICC crimes.
Newton fears that under the first category, state action regarding ordinary
crimes will never satisfy the ICC. According to the Rome Statute, if a person has
24. See Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution
Application Under Article 58(7) of the Statute, J 11-25 (April 27, 2007).
25. See id. 25.
26. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 51 (Mar. 4,
2009).
27. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
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already been tried in a national court for the same conduct as the ICC case, the
case is inadmissible under articles 17 and 20 unless the proceedings were meant to
shield the person or were otherwise improper.28 The ICC provision does not
specify that a case is admissible if the accused had been tried in another court for
ordinary crimes, unlike the statutes for the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As a result, it is possible that the ICC will take a
different approach from the prior tribunals, supporting complementarity rather than
undermining it. In her comments on Newton's piece, Professor Linda Carter
concludes that the principle of ne bis in idem will bar ICC prosecution if prior state
proceedings were proper, even if the charges related to the same incident were
ordinary crimes.2 9 On the other hand, the practice of the ICC (discussed in depth
below) may support the concern that the state must investigate or prosecute crimes
that match ICC provisions. As a result, state proceedings regarding ordinary crimes
related to the conduct under investigation at the ICC may not suffice.
Similarly, state proceedings based on narrower interpretations of ICC crimes of
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity (category two) may not satisfy
the ICC. Yet as discussed infra, the potentially troubling ICC interpretations
related to the person and conduct test often come in the context of self-referrals,
where the state professes no interest in acting against the accused, As a result, it is
difficult to predict whether the same narrow approach would be adopted in other
circumstances.
With regard to category three, Newton fears that state charges based on broader
definitions of ICC crimes also would not suffice because of legality issues. He
reasons that if a state uses a broader definition, the defendant might be able to raise
objections based on nullen crimen sine lege, which prohibits prosecution for
behavior that was not a crime at the time of the conduct. He asserts that the ICC
could then conclude that the state is genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute
because of the principle of legality. 30 It is possible that a successful legality
challenge to a controversial state charge, for example, starvation of civilians as a
war crime in a non-international conflict, would lead the ICC to deem the state
unable to act.31 Yet it seems more likely that the state would charge more than the
28. See id. art. 20(3).
29. See Linda E. Carter, The Principle of Complementarity and the International Criminal
Court: A Response to Professor Newton on the Role of Ne Bis in Idem, 8 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 165, 196 (2010).
30. Newton, supra note 2, at 149-150.
31. Id.
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controversial war crime; so long as multiple counts included other ICC enumerated
acts regarding war crimes, the state would be able to act. The state with a broader
definition of ICC crimes is therefore unlikely to face a conflict with the ICC-
unless the ICC requires that the state charges be an exact match to the allegations
in a case before the ICC.
The current practice can indeed be interpreted to require that state action relate
to the precise charges brought before the ICC. ICC practice implies that state
investigation or charges of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity
against the same person are not enough. As discussed below, it seems the state
must also be focused on the same predicate act (child soldiers in the case of
Lubanga) or same factual basis (a certain village in the case of Katanga). This ICC
practice, however, comes in the context of a self-referral from a state (the
Democratic Republic of Congo) that indicates, implicitly or explicitly, that it
would not now investigate or prosecute the accused. As a result, it is possible that
the ICC may be more lenient when considering a case in a different context. For
example, if the DRC had been actively investigating or prosecuting Lubanga, the
ICC might well have taken a different approach. Because the DRC self-referred the
case and turned over Lubanga to the ICC, its prior investigation became suspect in
terms of blocking ICC jurisdiction. The ICC may have taken a much less critical
approach if the DRC had been asserting jurisdiction based on a current
investigation into the same facts being pursued in a prosecutor-initiated case.
At bottom, many of the cases to date seem predicated on the notion that the
state is either inactive or unwilling to prosecute as evidenced by the state referral
of the case to the ICC and subsequent inaction. The stringent requirements implied
in current ICC practice might not apply in other circumstances. A worst-case
scenario, where the narrow approach is carried over to other contexts, would
support Newton's concerns. Fear of such an approach may lead states to conclude
that it is impossible to please the ICC and therefore cease state efforts to bring
international criminals to justice through state proceedings. Given the resources
required to investigate and prosecute those accused of ICC crimes-not to mention
political considerations-the state might use the most worrisome interpretation of
ICC practice as an excuse for inaction. For example, a state might point to the
Lubanga or Katanga decision and contend that because it cannot predict the acts or
incidents the ICC would want covered, it must simply refer the situation to the
ICC. Such an attitude would lead to even more self-referrals burdening the ICC,
and potentially increase impunity for offenders as the ICC becomes overwhelmed
with situations. As a result, although a worst-case interpretation of a "hostile" ICC
The Practice of the International Criminal Court
might not necessarily be warranted by all of the evidence to date, the basis for the
allegedly hostile attitude is explored in the subsequent discussion.
As Newton notes, the PTC in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga) case
applied a "person AND conduct" test to determine that the case was admissible.
32
Article 17 refers to state proceedings over the "case," which has been interpreted to
mean a specific incident such that the state proceedings must encompass the same
person and conduct. 33 The PTC holds that the same conduct element requires that
the charges brought by the state include the same enumerated act(s) charged by the
Prosecutor. Apparently, state officials are supposed to be able to predict the precise
charges that will be brought (and presumably confirmed without any subsequent
changes) 34 by the ICC.
In the Lubanga case, the same person was under arrest in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) for genocide and war crimes at the time the Prosecutor
sought the arrest warrants. 35 The state warrants related to war crimes whose
predicate acts apparently included murder, illegal detention, and torture,36 but not
the conscription or use of child soldiers. 37 The PTC therefore concluded that the
state was not acting in relation to the same case before the ICC, as defined by the
conduct that constitutes the basis of the Prosecutor's application for an arrest
warrant. 38 The lesson from this determination is that if a state wants to live up to
the Rome Statute's preamble regarding a state's duty to prosecute international
crimes,39 it must not only investigate or prosecute the same person but the same
conduct as the Prosecutor deems fit to charge. It must not only investigate the same
temporal and geographical area for war crimes, it must also focus on the specific
enumerated act(s) as subsequently charged by the Prosecutor. Yet as noted above,
the DRC had stopped any proceedings against Lubanga and turned him over to the
ICC. As Newton recognizes, it is not clear that the ICC would require such state
prescience or matching charges in other contexts.
32. Id. at 155; see also Prosecutor v. Harun, supra note 24, 24-25. The discussion regarding
admissibility of the case against Ali Kushayb was less extensive due to less information
regarding Sudan's investigation, particularly an arrest warrant.
33. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, art. 58, 31 (Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Lubanga
Warrants Decision].
34. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
35. See Lubanga Warrants Decision, supra note 33, 33.
36. See id.
37. See id. 39.
38. See id. 38, 40.
39. See Rome Statute, supra note 3.
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Assuming that the narrow approach applies outside the context of inactive self-
referring states, it is problematic. It is difficult to understand how a state could
predict the precise charges eventually brought by the Prosecutor, particularly in
situations of mass atrocities. Even within the ICC, there has been tension over
specific charges. In Lubanga, the PTC determined that the conflict in the DRC
could be characterized as international due to Uganda's involvement.40 Although
the Prosecutor had initially charged child conscription only in the context of a non-
international armed conflict, the PTC effectively modified the charges to include
child conscription in an international conflict. 41 Similarly, in the Bemba case, the
PTC induced a change in the relevant criminal conduct alleged by the Prosecutor.
The PTC suspended the confirmation of charges hearing and requested the
Prosecutor amend the charges to add another ground of criminal responsibility
based on command (military) or superior responsibility. 42 In the end, the PTC
confirmed only charges based on criminal responsibility of a military superior-a
mode of responsibility not originally charged by the Prosecutor.
43
Another facet of the specificity required in state proceedings is explored in the
recent admissibility challenge brought by Germain Katanga. The court's decision
can be read to require that the state investigation must focus on one particular
village on one particular day even when investigating the accused for multiple
attacks.44 But, again, the context here is a state (the DRC) that ceased investigation
against the accused and turned him over to the ICC for investigation and
prosecution. It is difficult to glean general rules of admissibility based on these
circumstances. It is interesting, however, that the defense counsel's concerns
regarding the ICC's practice of complementarity echo the worries voiced by
Newton, while Newton himself distinguishes Katanga as an easy case because of
the DRC's inaction.45 Even if the ICC practice is not intended to express hostility
to state proceedings, it is open to being interpreted that way. In the case against
40. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the
confirmation of charges (Jan. 29, 2007).
41. See id.
42. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-388, Decision Adjourning the
Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute (Mar. 3, 2009).
43. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, 1 184 (June 15, 2009).
44. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1213-tENG, Reasons for the Oral
Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the
Statute), 69-71 (June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Katanga Reasons for Oral Decision].
45. See Newton, supra note 2, at 161.
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Katanga, the Prosecution charged, and the PTC confirmed, counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity related to an attack on Bogoro village on February 24,
2003.46 The defense for Katanga challenged admissibility, arguing that at the time
of the ICC warrant issued against him, he was under arrest and investigation in the
DRC for the same conduct.47
The defense contends that the ICC's current interpretation of complementarity
negates the concerns raised by States at the Rome conference, defeats the principle's
object and purpose and turns it on its head; the current regime -as developed by the
Court's early practice.... is de iure one of complementarity, but de facto is nothing less
than primacy of the ICC over national courts.
48
It stresses the costs on the defendant related to ICC jurisdiction, including physical
relocation away from family and expected length of proceedings at the ICC. 49 The
defense further argues that the "same conduct" test is flawed in its "absolute
requirement of identical charges."5° Instead, complementarity should be about ICC
partnership and dialogue with the states, with a duty on the Prosecutor to assist
states rather than take over.51 The defense argues that a better test would give states
a "margin of appreciation in selecting crimes," and proposes a combination of a
"comparative gravity" and "comprehensive conduct" test.52 It asserts that the DRC
investigations were of crimes with the "same or greater gravity" as the ICC
charges and that they were "comprehensive" compared to the ICC charges.53 Even
if the same conduct test is applied, the defense claims there is evidence that the
DRC had charged Katanga with crimes against humanity related to the attack on
Bogoro 5 4 Finally, the defense argues that the DRC cannot be considered unable or
unwilling because the relevant time-frame is the time of the arrest warrant
application, when it was investigating and detaining Katanga.
55
46. See Case Information Sheet, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/-07,
http://www.icc-cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/EB9A6468-C81F-403F-86A1-
BB01A002199F/281173/KatangaChuiENGI .pdf.
47. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07-949, Motion Challenging
Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a)
of the Statute, $ 53 (Mar. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Katanga Admissibility Challenge].
48. Id. 919.
49. See id. 23, 25.
50. Id 31, 33.
51. See id. 1932-33.
52. Id 40- 51.
53. Katanga Admissibility Challenge, supra note 47, IT 15, 51.
54. See id 53.
55. See id. 63-64.
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The Prosecution counters that the DRC never focused substantively on Bogoro
and therefore the same conduct test fails. 56 It responds to Katanga's accusation that
the ICC is implementing ICC primacy by noting that "while States parties retain
primary responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes described
in Article 5, once a case has been found admissible before the Court, the latter has
primacy over concurrent domestic proceedings with respect to that particular case,
until determined otherwise by the Court.,
57
The Prosecution further contends that "[t]here is no duty on the Prosecutor to
assist states in their investigations."5 8 It points to "substantial reasons based on the
object and purpose of the Statute why such a burden, even if remotely conceivable
under the statutory language, should be avoided." 59 Specifically, the ICC was not
intended to be "an international investigative bureau with resdurces to support
national authorities." 60 At the same time, the Prosecution noted that it had not
refused any cooperation or assistance sought by the DRC.61
The Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) also weighs in with its
interpretation of article 17(1)'s requirement of a state investigation or prosecution
of the same case. It asserts that a local police investigation including police reports,
arrest warrants, witness interviews, victim interviews, etc., is insufficient where
"the balance of the evidence" supports unwillingness or inability.
62
The positions of the Prosecution and the OPCV can be interpreted to buttress
Newton's concern, echoed by the defense in Katanga, that the ICC is moving away
from the cooperative approach to complementarity. The Prosecution, while
asserting that it did not refuse to cooperate with the DRC, does not seem
particularly interested in affirming the ICC's desire to assist state proceedings; on
the other hand, this could stem from an understanding that the DRC did not
actually wish to pursue a case against Katanga. The OPCV puts forth a narrow
56. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1007, Public Redacted Version of
the 19th March 2009 Prosecution Response to Motion Challenging Admissibility of the
Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), 3-4 (Mar. 30,
2009).
57. Id. 76.
58. Id. 98.
59. Id. 100.
60. Id.
61. See id. 102.
62. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1007, Observations of the OPCV on the
Defence for Germain Katanga's Motion Challenging Admissibility of the Case with one
Confidential exparte OPCV only Annex and three Public Annexes, 27 (Apr. 28, 2009).
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view of investigation. However, it balances that view with the assumption of state
unwillingness or inability.
The Trial Chamber (TC) dismissed Katanga's challenge to admissibility. 63 As
discussed further below, its determination relies on the lack of state action since
the self-referral, where the DRC indicated its lack of readiness to go forward with
the case. But the TC's opinion may also imply that the state proceedings must be
based on the same conduct. It holds that it does not need to rule on the "same
conduct" test in light of the DRC's inaction: specifically its refusal to prosecute
"this case. '64 When discussing the "case," however, the TC refers to one specific
attack. It relies on the fact that at the time of the ICC warrant application, the DRC
was not investigating Katanga with regard to the Bogoro attack. 5 Although
Katanga was initially under investigation and arrest for many crimes, evidence of
which included a document referring to Bogoro, the defense did not show
sufficient focus on the attack on Bogoro on February 24, 2003.66 Thus, the TC
decision on the Katanga admissibility challenge to some extent sustains the
contention that the ICC might require the same precise conduct to be covered by
the state proceedings.
Furthermore, it is even possible, albeit unlikely, that the ICC will require a
match regarding the mode of individual criminal responsibility. For example, if a
state had previously investigated and charged Bemba with war crimes as a joint
perpetrator but not as a superior, would the PTC have determined that this was not
the same case as that before the ICC?
Or perhaps the ICC would require that the proceedings themselves resemble
those provided for in the Rome Statute. The Trial Chamber in Katanga inquired
into whether the DRC would provide a fair trial and appropriate punishment if
63. The defense appealed. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-
1234, Appeal of the Defense for Germain Katanga against the Decision of the Trial
Chamber 'Motifs de la dcision orale relative a l'exception d'irrecevabilitg de l'affaire'
(June 22, 2009). As this article was in the final editing stages, the Appeals Chamber
confirmed the Trial Chamber's decision. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07
OA 8, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case (Sept. 25, 2009). It stressed
two key findings: (1) unwillingness and inability are considered only when, at the time of
the admissibility challenge, there are current domestic investigations or prosecutions or a
prior investigation and decision not to prosecute; (2) state inaction renders a case
admissible, subject to the gravity requirement.
64. Katanga Reasons for Oral Decision, supra note 44, T 95.
65. Id. at 69-71.
66. Id. at 70 (noting lack of clear attribution of Bogoro attack on specified date to Katanga).
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Katanga were sent to the DRC for trial.67 Moreover, the OPCV intimates that the
state proceedings must provide the same level of victims' rights as those provided
for under the Rome Statute.68
The ICC practice to date can be interpreted to support Newton's contention that
the ICC is undermining complementarity via a rigid interpretation of state action
on the same case. In particular, it seems problematic that states conducting wide-
ranging investigations into war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
might be required to include the specific enumerated act that would be chosen by
the Prosecutor and/or confirmed by the PTC. The apparent trend is troubling,
particularly where the Prosecution itself seems to have difficulty predicting the
actual charges that will be tried at the ICC. As noted by Newton in the context of
the Katanga admissibility challenge, however, it is not clear whether the narrow
interpretation of the "same case" would be used in cases that were not self-referred
by a subsequently inactive state. It is possible that the ostensible tendency toward
supranational primacy merely reflects the inevitable growing pains of a young
institution dealing with complicated issues. These concerns may not come to pass
if the current approach is limited in context to cases where the state self-refers and
ceases action. If the narrow approach to same person, same conduct is applied in
other contexts, however, it may intimate hostility to state action, particularly when
combined with the statements made regarding gravity of crimes.
IV. Reliance on "Gravity"
In addition to assessing state action regarding a case, the ICC also considers the
gravity of the case.69 If a case is not of sufficient gravity, the case is inadmissible.
There are some potentially troubling statements regarding gravity in the early
decisions of the PTC, but the Appeals Chamber has rejected them. Similarly, while
some statements regarding gravity can be interpreted to support Newton's
contention that gravity is overwhelming the other provisions of the article 17
67. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-T-65-ENG, Transcript of Hearing on 1
June 2009 regarding Admissibility Challenge, 99 (June 1, 2009). See also Newton, supra
note 2, at 163 (noting "a prima facie demonstration that the [state] proceedings will be fair,
impartial and in accordance with international standards" should suffice).
68. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Observations on behalf of victims pursuant
to article 19(1) of the Rome Statute, 32 (Nov. 18, 2008) (victims are of the view that
Ugandan prosecution would deprive victims of rights granted in Rome Statute, "unless the
Ugandan Authorities carefully implement the said rights" in its prosecution of the accused).
69. Rome Statute supra note 3, arts. 17, 53.3.
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admissibility test, there are other plausible interpretations of those statements. In
particular, it seems that "gravity" is often used as a defense mechanism to justify
prosecutorial actions in the face of criticism.
As Newton notes, the PTC adopted a very stringent definition of gravity in the
Lubanga case, wherein the PTC considered requests for warrants against both
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Bosco Ntaganda.7 ° It required that the conduct be
systematic or large-scale, including the extent of social alarm caused in the
community.71 It effectively established a three-part test for gravity: (1) is the
conduct systematic or large-scale with due consideration given to social alarm?;
(2) is the accused one of the most senior leaders of the situation under
investigation?; and (3) is the accused also suspected of being most responsible
based on his role in the relevant group and the role of the group in the commission
of crimes within the situation? A case may be deemed sufficiently grave if all three
questions are answered in the affirmative. 72 With regard to the accused, Ntaganda,
the PTC found that despite Ntaganda's command position as Deputy Chief of
General Staff for military operations within the Forces Patriotiques pour la
Libdration du Congo (FPLC), he was not among the most senior leaders within the
DRC situation.73 As a result, the PTC found the case against Ntaganda
inadmissible for lack of sufficient gravity, while issuing the arrest warrant against
Lubanga.
74
This test sets the bar quite high for gravity. The result of using this test, though,
seems to be to enhance, rather than undermine, the principle of complementarity in
that it would encourage more state action. The more significant problem is that it
would likely enhance impunity as well, because it would leave anyone but the most
senior leaders of the most significant groups to states that may well be unwilling or
unable to address the crimes. The PTC asserted that the ICC would maximize
deterrence by requiring all cases to be against the most responsible senior leaders
70. Newton, supra note 2, at 158-59.
71. Lubanga Warrants Decision, supra note 33, $ 36.
72. See id. 9 63.
73. See id. 85-89.
74. See id. 9 89. The PTC found the case against Lubanga admissible. Lubanga's initial appeal
of the decision to grant the arrest warrant was later dismissed as abandoned. See Prosecutor
v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01106-722, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the
Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006 (Dec. 14, 2006)
(affirming PTC decision rejecting defendant's challenge to jurisdiction based on alleged
abuse of process).
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of significant groups in a situation.75 The Appeals Chamber rejected this reasoning,
along with the PTC's entire gravity test.
76
The Appeals Chamber rejected the test for several reasons. First, it contradicts
the drafters' intent to require that all crimes be systematic or large-scale in order to
pass the gravity threshold. The definitions of crimes include requirements of
systematic or large-scale conduct in specific crimes such as crimes against
humanity (requiring a widespread or systematic attack). It is improper to expand
those requirements to every crime before the ICC. 77 Second, the Appeals Chamber
finds no basis in the statute for the subjective and conjectural requirement of social
alarm in the international community. 8
Third, the focus on only those most responsible leaders would more likely
decrease, rather than increase, deterrence by excluding all other categories of
perpetrators. The "predictable exclusion of many perpetrators" based on the PTC
test would undermine the preventive role of the ICC.7 9 Moreover, "individuals who
are not at the very top of an organization may still carry considerable influence and
commit, or generate the widespread commission of, very serious crimes." 80 And
unlike other international instruments establishing criminal tribunals, "the Rome
Statute mentions the 'most serious crimes' but not 'most serious perpetrators.'
81
The Appeals Chamber declined the Prosecutor's request to establish a proper
82test for determining gravity under article 17(1)(d). It was not necessary for the
Appeals Chamber to assess the gravity provision because it held that the PTC erred
in finding an admissibility determination to be a prerequisite for a warrant of
arrest.83 The Appeals Chamber noted that the PTC will generally not have
84sufficient information to determine admissibility at the warrant stage. Moreover,
the PTC should typically not make an initial determination of admissibility
because it may be detrimental to the accused; the accused would face some degree
75. See Lubanga Warrants Decision, supra note 33, 1 55.
76. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-169-PUB-Exp, Judgment on the Prosecutor's
appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," (July 13, 2006) (this document was
reclassified as public) [hereinafter Lubanga Appeals Decision].
77. See id. % 69-72.
78. See id. 72.
79. Id. 77 73-74.
80. Id. 77.
81. See id. 79.
82. See Lubanga Appeals Decision, supra note 76, 89.
83. See id. 42.
84. See id. 45.
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of predetermination if he later raises an admissibility challenge where the PTC has
already determined admissibility against him.85 Where the Appeals Chamber
reverses a PTC finding of inadmissibility at the warrant stage, "the suspect would
be faced with a decision by the Appeals Chamber that the case is admissible. The
right of the suspect to challenge the admissibility of the case before the Pre-Trial
and-potentially-the Appeals Chamber thus would be seriously impaired.,
86
While the PTC has discretion under article 19 to determine admissibility at the
warrant stage, it should do so "only when it is appropriate in the circumstances of
the case, bearing in mind the interests of the suspect., 87 The circumstances include
"instances where a case is based on the established jurisprudence of the Court,
uncontested facts that render a case clearly inadmissible or an ostensible cause
impelling the exercise of [propio motu] review.., bearing in mind the rights of
other participants."8 8 The Appeals Chamber therefore reversed the PTC's
determination of inadmissibility and remanded the application for the arrest
warrant to the PTC. 89 The PTC subsequently issued a warrant of arrest against
Ntaganda in August of 2006, a decision that was unsealed in April of 2008.90
Although Newton's criticisms of the PTC gravity test are well-founded, the
Appeals Chamber has already rejected that test. It is possible those subsequent
courts will dismiss this rejection as dicta or that the ICC will adopt another
arguably problematic test for gravity, but that remains to be seen.
Newton's other concern is that the gravity prong of the admissibility test is
overtaking other considerations. While some of the practices of the ICC do support
this, the ICC is also addressing other parts of the admissibility test. As discussed
supra Part III, the ICC has looked at state action regarding a case; this
consideration goes to article 17(1)(a-c) rather than the gravity provision in article
17(l)(d). Nonetheless, there have been some potentially disturbing statements
made that could be interpreted to elevate gravity over the other admissibility
requirements.
For example, in the situation in Uganda, the Prosecutor emphasized gravity of
crimes as selection criteria, asserting that he opened the investigation into the
85. See id. 46-50 (noting that "[a] degree of predetermination is inevitable." Id. 1 50.).
86. Id. $50.
87. Id. 52.
88. Lubanga Appeals Decision, supra note 76, 52.
89. See id. 58.
90. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2-Anx-tENG, Warrant of Arrest (Aug.
22, 2006).
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Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) but not into Ugandan forces because of the
severity of crimes of the LRA.91 Similarly, the Prosecutor singled out conscription
and use of child soldiers in the Lubanga case as an offense of special concern to
the international community and therefore particularly grave. 92 In expanding the
investigation in Sudan to focus on rebel attacks on peacekeepers in Haskanita, the
Prosecutor again chose to focus on a particular type of conduct in the midst of
other more widespread offenses. 93 As Newton describes it, it seems that the
Prosecutor and PTC "colluded to put the ICC stamp of moral and prosecutorial
disapproval on selected atrocities based only on the nature of the offenses." 94 He
concludes that this presumes "supranational superiority" based solely on the
gravity of the offense, with the ICC practically daring a state to attempt to reclaim
jurisdiction. 95
Much of Newton's concern about singling out these particular crimes stems
from the definition of gravity in terms of "social alarm," a definition that seems to
have been rejected by the Appeals Chamber. Moreover, the emphasis on gravity
might stem from other reasons, such as a perceived need to counter criticism
regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
With regard to the situation in Uganda, the Prosecutor faced accusations of
favoritism from the start. The Prosecutor appeared at a press conference with
President Museveni of Uganda, where Museveni announced his referral of the
situation in Northern Uganda concerning the LRA. The Prosecutor was criticized
for appearing to endorse Ugandan wishes that the ICC investigate the LRA, but not
Ugandan forces. He subsequently reassured the public that he would investigate all
parties to the conflict, but this did not quiet accusations of partiality. Some
commentators accused the Prosecutor of cutting a deal with Museveni, agreeing to
limit his investigation to the LRA if Uganda referred the case to the ICC. 96 When
the Prosecutor focused on the crimes of the LRA, bringing charges against Joseph
Kony and other rebel leaders, he justified the one-sided nature of the charges by
91. See Newton, supra note 2, at n. 143.
92. Press Release, Child soldier charges in the first International Criminal Court Case, ICC-
OTP-20060828-157, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=a486dedd-Obl a-4cb2-814b-
3969d616f4e9&lan=en-GB.
93. See Newton, supra note 2, at 158.
94. Id. at 159.
95. Idat 160.
96. See, e.g., William Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, 27
HuM. RTs. L. J. 25, 31 (2006).
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pointing to the gravity of crimes of the LRA as compared to the Ugandan forces.
97
Thus, it is plausible that "gravity" was being used as a defense mechanism to
counter charges of favoritism-not as a mechanism to overwhelm all other
admissibility considerations.
98
Similarly, the Prosecutor faced criticism for charging Lubanga for conscription
and use of child soldiers, but not for other crimes allegedly committed. In
particular, advocates for women's rights agitated for charges based on the
widespread sexual violence in Ituri allegedly attributable to Lubanga. 99 Again, as
Newton notes, the Prosecutor turned to the notion of gravity to defend his choice
of charges.
Although the Prosecutor's charging choices may be troubling, it does not
necessarily follow that these references to gravity foreshadow a refusal to consider
other grounds of admissibility. Nonetheless, it might raise concerns in conjunction
with the interpretation of "same person, same conduct" as discussed above. If the
Prosecutor singles out a predicate act, like child conscription, as particularly grave
and all the ICC counts against an accused relate to that specific conduct, then the
state proceedings must also cover that conduct. It seems to undermine the
principles of complementarity, deterrence, and an end to impunity for the ICC to
reject state proceedings that bring multiple charges of genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity against an accused-covering the bulk of alleged
international crimes-but not the particular predicate act of child conscription.
This is especially problematic when the ICC charges are seen by many to cover
less serious crimes; as William Schabas has noted, child soldier recruitment may
be less grave than other crimes.'00 Yet it remains to be seen whether the ICC will
take this attitude outside the context of an inactive self-referring state, such as the
DRC.
97. See Newton, supra note 2, at n. 143.
98. Cf William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court, 6 J. OF INT'L GRIM. JUSTICE 731, 738 (2008) (discussing sudden emphasis
on gravity when "Prosecutor found that he was required to defend his initial choices of
whom to target in prosecutions" with example of Ugandan case selection).
99. Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, Letter to Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, ICC-
01/04-313-Anx 1 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc252017.pdf (last
visited Dec. 17, 2009).
100. See Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, supra note 96, at 743-
744, 760 (noting implicit evidence in Rome Statute that war crimes are less serious and
terming child soldier recruitment as arguably "closer to the mala prohibita than the mala in
se end of the spectrum," and therefore not necessarily significant enough for the first trial at
the ICC).
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The Prosecutor's selection of a rebel group's attack on African Union
peacekeepers at Haskanita is more complicated. It could be argued that the focus
on a rebel group, rather than defendants linked to the government of Sudan, is in
itself a response to criticism of one-sided case selection in the situation in Darfur.
On the other hand, it could be said that the Prosecutor is not using gravity as a
defense mechanism; rather he could be accused of misusing the gravity criterion by
singling out an attack where 12 people were killed in the midst of widespread
killings and other crimes. The Prosecutor has argued that the attack is of
exceptional seriousness because of its target (peacekeepers under a U.N. mandate)
and impact on the African Union Mission in Sudan; in effect, he argues that the
crimes are particularly grave because they are attacks on the international
community.' 0' This seems more in line with Newton's concern that the ICC is
effectively anointing certain crimes with an imprimatur of gravity such that
admissibility challenges would be futile or at least disfavored.
In sum, the ICC does not seem to be relying on gravity to exclude all other
admissibility factors in its current practice, and the Prosecutor's emphasis on
gravity might be explained as a defense mechanism rather than an attempt to
circumvent complementarity. At the same time, when the Prosecutor's gravity-
based charging decisions are combined with the ICC's interpretation of "same
person, same conduct," the net result may be seen as a possible move toward
supranational supremacy, as Newton puts it.
V. Self-Referrals and Complementarity
The appearance of ICC supremacy may be enhanced, or perhaps explained if
not justified, by the unexpected practice of state self-referrals. Newton contends
that the ICC has effectively concluded that a self-referral automatically establishes
that a state is unwilling and unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute,
regardless of subsequent events. In practice, the ICC has recognized changed
circumstances after referrals. It could be said, however, that the ICC went out of its
way to proclaim its power to determine whether state action after a self-referral
will render a case inadmissible. This does not support Newton's assertion that self-
referrals lead to automatically admissible cases. Nonetheless, it could be
101. Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. 02/05-02/09-16 Annex 1, Filing in the Record of
Prosecution's Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58,
pursuant to the request contained in the Decision on the Prosecutor's Application under
Article 58, dated 7 May 2009, 7, 173-75 (May 20, 2009).
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interpreted to support Newton's contention in part by buttressing his claim that the
ICC is hostile to state proceedings after a self-referral.
First, the ICC's practice does not establish that self-referrals render a case
admissible in perpetuity. In the case of Lubanga, the PTC concluded that the
DRC's letter of referral established that the state was unable to investigate or
prosecute at that time. 102 The PTC went on to acknowledge that the DRC judicial
system had expanded its capacity since the date of the referral and had issued
warrants for the accused. 10 3 The PTC did not rely on the self-referral itself to reject
any assertion of state jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it held that the DRC was
not acting with regard to the accused's alleged conscription and use of child
soldiers.' 4 Because there was no state action, there was no need to discuss whether
the state was unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. 105
With regard to Uganda's self-referral, the ICC has not assumed that the state
waived its right to challenge admissibility. Indeed, the PTC sua sponte raised the
issue of admissibility in reaction to Uganda's unsigned peace deal with the LRA,
which apparently requires Kony and the other ICC accused to be prosecuted within
a special division of the High Court of Uganda.
When the arrest warrants against Kony et. al. were sought in July of 2005, the
PTC was satisfied that the case "appears to be admissible."'' 0 6 At this stage, there
was apparently little discussion of admissibility, probably because of the self-
referral. In February of 2008, however, the PTC noted the recent agreement and
annexure between the LRA and Uganda. The PTC also noted the agreement's
implications for state prosecution and for Uganda's execution of the ICC arrest
warrants. 10 7 Uganda responded by first noting that the necessary legislation
regarding domestic prosecution in the High Court will not be finalized until Kony
actually signs the agreement and annexure. It also stated, "The special division of
the High Court is not meant to supplant the work of the International Criminal
Court and accordingly, those individuals who were indicted by the International
Criminal Court will have to be brought before the special division of the High
102. See Lubanga Warrants Decision, supra note 33, 36.
103. See id. 37.
104. Seeid. 39.
105. Seeid. 41.
106. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-1-US-Exp, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58, 2 (July 8, 2005) [hereinafter Kony
Warrants Decision].
107. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Request for Information from the
Republic of Uganda on the Status of Execution of the Warrants of Arrest, 5 (Feb. 29, 2008).
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Court for trial." 10 8 In assessing admissibility, the PTC noted that this response
seemed internally contradictory. At a minimum, it reflected apparent confusion
over who has the power to interpret and apply the provisions governing
complementarity.'
09
Despite public statements indicating that Uganda would prosecute Kony and the
other ICC accused, Uganda has not challenged admissibility at this time.
Nonetheless, the PTC engaged in a long process to determine admissibility on its
own. The PTC could have given Uganda the opportunity to pass implementing
legislation, or it could have waited to see if Uganda was able to obtain custody
over Kony et. al., either via the peace process or otherwise. Instead, the PTC
appointed defense counsel for Kony and the others, which raised a host of
contentious issues. 110 It received observations and responses from the prosecutor,
counsel for the defense, Uganda, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and
amicus curiae. The PTC distinguished the Appeals Chamber's decision in
Ntaganda, where it established appropriate circumstances to determine
admissibility sua sponte such as based on established jurisprudence, uncontested
facts or ostensible cause. The PTC held that the judgment in Ntaganda related to
the arrest warrant stage and was therefore inapplicable here. It implicitly rejected
the Appeals Chamber's concerns about the negative effect of determining
admissibility in early stages of the case."' The PTC noted that, as multiple
admissibility determinations are possible, the defendants retained the right to
challenge admissibility.' 12
In the end, the PTC concluded that there had been no change since the warrant
stage and therefore no reason to review the positive determination of admissibility
made at that time. 13 The PTC stated that "the purpose of the Proceedings remains
108. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-286-Anx.2, Request for Information from
the Republic of Uganda on the Status of Execution of the Warrants of Arrest, 3 (Mar. 27,
2008).
109. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the admissibility of the
case under article 19(1) of the Statute, 45 (Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Kony Admissibility
Decision].
110. See generally Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-350, Submission of
observations on the admissibility of the Case under article 19(1) of the Statute, Counsel for
Defense (18 Nov. 2008) (questioning mandate of counsel and noting potential ethical
violations related to possible conflicts of interest among defendants and inability to
communicate with accused).
111. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
112. See Kony Warrants Decision, supra note 106, 20-29.
113. See id. 52.
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limited to dispelling uncertainty as to who has ultimate authority to determine the
admissibility of the Case: it is for the Court, and not for Uganda, to make such a
determination."'
14
Thus, the PTC triggered a long process requiring substantial effort from
multiple parties with the apparent aim of proclaiming its power. While the PTC's
position that the ICC determines admissibility is correct and Uganda's public
statements did seem to indicate confusion on this point, it can be argued that it was
excessive to initiate an entire process simply to announce this straightforward
interpretation of the statute. The PTC's actions can be interpreted to support
Newton in terms of characterizing the ICC's attitude as one of competition rather
than cooperation. Uganda may, of course, bring an admissibility challenge of its
own, although there might be issues with regard to timing." 5 Regardless, there is
the specter of prejudgment as noted by the Appeals Chamber in relation to the
Ntaganda admissibility determination. 116
The time and effort spent on an admittedly premature 1 7 process could have
been spent consulting with Uganda to ensure that the state would not be deemed
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute based on the envisioned special
division of the High Court. The ICC's practice with regard to Uganda does not
necessarily confirm Newton's fear that self-referring states will be deemed
eternally "unable," but it may buttress his contention that the ICC seems hostile to
state assertions ofjurisdiction after a self-referral.
This conclusion may be supported by the Katanga case. In its decision rejecting
Katanga's admissibility challenge, the Trial Court (TC) emphasized that the DRC
had referred the situation to the ICC and did not itself challenge admissibility."
8
The TC noted, in the hearing on Katanga's motion, that the DRC indicated the
state had referred the case in order to end impunity and would not now start
114. Id. 51. The defense appealed. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-379,
Defense Appeal against "Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the
Statute" dated 10 March 2009 (Mar. 26, 2009). As this article was in the final editing
stages, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-
02/04-01/05 OA 3, Judgment on the appeal of the Defense against the "Decision on the
admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute" of 10 March 2009 (Sept. 16,
2009).
115. A state with jurisdiction over a case that brings a challenge under article 19(2)(b) on the
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting shall make a challenge at the earliest
opportunity. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19(5).
116. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
117. See Kony Admissibility Decision, supra note 109, 51.
118. Katanga Reasons for Oral Decision, supra note 44, 94-95.
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proceedings against Katanga. 119 The TC concluded that "the DRC clearly intends
to leave it up to the Court to prosecute Germain Katanga and to try him for the acts
committed on 24 February 2003 in Bogoro."' 20 The TC locates an unexpressed
form of "unwillingness" in article 17, where a state does not want to shield the
person from responsibility, but nonetheless rejects state action. 121 "This second
form of 'unwillingness', which is not expressly provided for in article 17 of the
Statute, aims to see the person brought to justice, but not before national courts.'
122
The state acts in accordance with complementarity by referring a situation to the
ICC if it considers it opportune to do so, for reasons such as circumstances
unfavorable to state proceedings. 1
23
The TC effectively endorses state inaction for a variety of reasons, so long as
the state cooperates with the ICC. 124 It is likely that in most situations, the state
will also refer the case to the ICC. Thus, self-referrals can be equated with
unwillingness, although the gravity and ne bis in idem provisions of article 17 may
still block admissibility.' 25 Of course, it is unlikely that there has been a prior state
prosecution in this scenario. The possible impact of the gravity aspect was
discussed in Part IV, supra.
The Katanga decision, with its expanded definition of unwillingness, seems to
put the defendant in a particularly difficult situation.126 Even if, as the defense
contended, the state had investigated and detained a suspect for years for similar
conduct, the ICC could step in simply by making slightly different prosecutorial
choices after a self-referral. 127 Where the state subsequently disavows any intention
of investigating the accused, the desire to end impunity might clash with the rights
of defendants. The tension is tempered somewhat by the extensive protections
119. Seeid. 194.
120. Id. 195.
121. I d . 777.
122. Id.
123. See id. 780.
124. Katanga Reasons for Oral Decision, supra note 44, at 79 (noting that state can fulfill
Preamble's duty of exercising criminal jurisdiction if it "considers that it is more opportune
for the Court to carry out an investigation or prosecution" so long as it surrenders a suspect
it has in custody to the Court and cooperates fully).
125. See id. 77 81, 86-87.
126. For an extensive discussion of interpreting admissibility through the lens of the accused
(and as a way to protect state sovereignty or a limit on the power of the ICC), see William
W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The
International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 257 (2009).
127. See Katanga Reasons for Oral Decision, supra note 44, 7 88.
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accorded to accused in the Rome Statute. Yet the statutory protections do not
necessarily avoid the hardships highlighted by Katanga, such as lengthy detention
far from family. Regardless, the Katanga TC determined that the defense's
concerns regarding the conditions of ICC trials are irrelevant to admissibility.1
28
Again, in practice the DRC self-referral did not block an inquiry into
admissibility. Nonetheless, it appears that a self-referral generally weighs heavily
in favor of ICC jurisdiction. The referral itself implies that the state is unwilling or
unable to act. It seems that the state would bear a heavy burden to subsequently
prove to the ICC that it is investigating or prosecuting genuinely the same person
for the exact same conduct. This is particularly true if the state must show that it is
investigating the same event (such as one attack on one village, in the midst of
many such attacks allegedly committed by the accused) and/or plans to charge the
same enumerated act as the ICC (such as child conscription), possibly with the
same mode of liability (criminal responsibility as a military superior rather than
joint perpetrator). The level of detail required for the state proceedings does give
the impression that the ICC may be reluctant to allow states, particularly self-
referring states, to (re)assert primacy. Thus, the effect of self-referrals combines
with practice regarding charging choices and an emphasis on grave crimes to yield
the appearance of a competitive rather than cooperative spirit. 29 This presumes,
however, that the state actually wants to compete with the ICC by asserting
jurisdiction. In many of the cases to date, the state has disavowed any interest in
prosecuting the accused subsequent to the referral. It remains to be seen how the
ICC will react to state competition for primacy, but any challenge will raise issues
of how the ICC should assess deferrals to national proceedings.
VI. Deference to National Proceedings
To remedy the supposed reluctance of ICC actors to allow state proceedings
related to an ICC case, Newton advocates that the ICC "should ...defer to
domestic investigations or prosecutions in any feasible conditions."' 30 Even if the
domestic charges do not perfectly match the "prosecutorial preferences" of the
ICC, the ICC should defer to the "good faith reasoning" of state officials who are
128. Seeid. at 84.
129. This conclusion regarding to self-referrals does not assert a state right to unilaterally
withdraw a referral. For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Michael P. Scharf & Patrick
Dowd, No Way Out? The Question of Unilateral Withdrawals or Referrals to the ICC and
Other Human Rights Courts, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 573 (2009).
130. Newton, supra note 2, at 164.
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applying national law.1 3 In order to implement this deference, Newton has
mentioned a Commission of Experts on Complementarity or another mechanism
adopted through the Assembly of States Parties or by amendment to the statute. 1
32
This proposal raises many intriguing questions, both procedural and substantive.
With regard to the potential body of experts, factors to consider include the
necessity of a new body; how it would fit within the current structure of the ICC;
the nature of the commission, such as whether it should be ad-hoc or permanent,
with full or part-time experts and rules on conflicts of interest; its make-up,
including whether members are appointed or elected and by whom (e.g., the
Assembly of States Parties or the Court), etc.
With regard to the level of deference, it will be challenging to develop standards
for assessing "good faith reasoning" or "feasible conditions." Does the evaluation
include an examination of the independence or impartiality of the relevant state
officials or the judicial system as a whole; an assessment of the support of the
citizens, including victims groups, for domestic rather than international
proceedings; an exploration of the democratic nature of the state, the level of
partiality or corruption within state government? Would the review mechanism
approach this akin to a de novo review, where it examines the state's evidence,
investigation, and charges from scratch, or would a more deferential abuse of
discretion-type standard of review be used?
Others have attempted to offer procedural or substantive guidelines as well,
although Newton's assessment that is more recent has the advantage of taking into
account more evidence of the practice of the ICC to date. For example, I have
attempted to offer some guidelines for the ICC in the context of deferring to
nonprosecutorial alternatives: suggestions that would apply equally to state
prosecutorial proceedings. 133 In addition to article 17's admissibility provisions
discussed above, I examined the other possible avenues for deferring to state
proceedings in order to implement complementarity: article 16's Security Council
deferral request (providing for a twelve-month renewable suspension of an ICC
131. Id.
132. Michael Newton, Panel Remarks at Santa Clara Journal of International Law Symposium,
The Future of International Criminal Justice (Mar. 13-14, 2009).
133. See Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209 (2008); see also Linda
M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal
Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. No. 1 (2008) available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net (in
English with French translation).
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investigation or prosecution); article 20's ne bis in idem prohibition; and article
53's prosecutorial discretion provision (allowing the Prosecutor to decide not to go
forward with an investigation or prosecution in the interests ofjustice).I concluded
that while none of these provisions require deference to nonprosecutorial
alternatives such as a truth commission or a traditional justice mechanism like
Uganda's Acholi mato oput ceremony, the provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to
allow for such deference. 1
3 4
Given the emphasis of the international community on prosecution in ending
impunity, any domestic nonprosecutorial alternative must first be shown to be
necessary and legitimate. If so, the ICC should evaluate the alternative justice
mechanism on the merits. Rather than attempt to assess whether these alternative
justice mechanisms are worthy of deferral in a vacuum, the ICC should defer if the
state process will further the purported goals of the ICC. Although contested, the
most commonly accepted goals of the ICC include retribution, deterrence,
expressivism and restorative justice. If the alternative justice mechanism can
further these goals as well as (or as poorly as) ICC prosecution, then the ICC
should defer. 135 Similarly, one might argue that the ICC should defer to state
criminal investigation or prosecution if such proceedings advance the goals of
international criminal justice. The ICC, including the proposed commission of
experts, might assess to what extent the state investigation or prosecution furthers
retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice, as compared to ICC
proceedings.
One could apply this test to state criminal investigation or prosecution in light
of the current practice at the ICC. For example, assuming the DRC had continued
investigating and prosecuting Lubanga for numerous counts of genocide and war
crimes, should the ICC defer even where the DRC's prosecutorial choices of
crimes do not include conscription and use of child soldiers? Newton's general
principle of deferring to good faith prosecution would say yes. One might
elaborate on the underlying reasons for such deference by looking at the goals of
the ICC. On the one hand, the prosecution of the accused for conscription and use
of child soldiers strongly furthers expressivism; it sends a message that the
international community is particularly interested in ending impunity for this
crime. Yet state prosecution for multiple other crimes would likely advance
134. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan
Alternative Justice Mechanisms, supra note 133, at 237-59.
135. See id. at 259-78.
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expressivism as well, although it would send the condemnatory message for
different crimes. If the crimes charged were based on the rampant gender-based
violence in the DRC, the expressivist message would arguably be as valuable as
sending a message confined to child soldiers. Ideally, of course, one body-the
ICC or the state-would be in a position to send both messages. This is where
cooperation between the ICC and states would come into play; consultations
between the two parties might lead to state prosecutions that also include the
charges preferred by the ICC, particularly if the ICC were to share evidence with
the state and take other capacity-building steps.
136
With regard to retribution, it could be argued that more is more-if the DRC
were ready, willing and able to pursue genocide and war crimes based on many
enumerated acts (as compared to the ICC's charges related solely to child soldiers),
the greater scope of crimes and victims might yield more retributive justice. The
numbers might be relevant to an assessment of deterrence as well; if a broader
range of crimes are charged in a state proceeding, then state prosecution for
multiple counts of genocide and war crimes might have a deterrent impact equal to
(or greater than) ICC prosecution for conscription and use of child soldiers.
Similarly, restorative justice might be advanced more by state prosecution of a
wider scope of activity than the narrow conduct covered by the ICC charges. Many
victims currently excluded from the Lubanga case at the ICC might be covered by
broader state proceedings. Moreover, if selective charging at the ICC leads to some
crimes being charged against only one group in a multi-group conflict, restorative
justice might be undermined. As one women's rights organization noted in a letter
to the ICC Prosecutor objecting to the exclusion of crimes of sexual violence in the
face of ample evidence against Lubanga, it is likely that future gender-based
crimes in the DRC would be alleged against members of militias other than
Lubanga's group. 13 7 It wrote, "Our concern is that if gender-based crimes are
charged in cases for example brought against [a different militia] in which the
victims are Hema women, this will be perceived by Lendu victims [of Lubanga's
militia] as a double persecution. Such a result would not be conducive to the
restoration of peace and reconciliation in the region, and could be a cause of future
tensions." 138
136. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 93(10) (providing that the Court may, upon request,
cooperate and provide assistance to the state investigating or prosecuting relevant crimes,
such as transmitting evidence obtained in course of investigation at the ICC).
137. See Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, supra note 99.
138. Id. at 5.
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This brief analysis may raise more questions than it answers, but it offers an
example of the complicated calculus that anyone must perform to determine
whether the ICC should defer to state proceedings, whether criminal prosecution or
alternative mechanisms. Newton argues for a preference for state criminal
investigation and prosecution. It is not clear whether the same preference should be
accorded to state nonprosecutorial alternatives. Does positive complementarity
require that the ICC also defer to good faith efforts to address international crimes
via a conditional amnesty, truth commission or traditional justice mechanism?
What sort of criteria or guidelines should be used here, and is there a different,
perhaps lower, level of deference to nonprosecutorial methods? These questions
remain to be explored, but Newton's article is an excellent starting point for
thinking about the difficulties of interpreting and implementing complementarity
in practice.
VII. Conclusion
Newton is concerned that the ICC will effectively omit the article 17
admissibility test or at least ignore important components of it, particularly when
dealing with self-referrals. He asserts that once the Security Council refers a case
to the ICC, it is automatically admissible. Moreover, he fears that the ICC has
intimated that once it deems a crime particularly grave, the case will be considered
automatically admissible. In a related line of argument, he fears that if the ICC
does perform a full admissibility assessment, it will take an improperly narrow
view of state charging decisions and thereby find too many states unable or
unwilling to investigate or prosecute the case. He therefore advocates that the ICC
should defer to state investigations or prosecutions whenever feasible.
It seems that the current practice of the ICC offers some support for Newton's
thesis, although questions can be raised regarding the details, as noted above.
Overall, it seems that there is a trend toward statements and decisions at the ICC
that can be interpreted as hostile to state proceedings. Yet it should be noted that
the ICC could be said to currently embrace state wishes by keeping cases at the
ICC after a self-referral. In the DRC cases, the end result comported with the
state's desire for the ICC to investigate and prosecute. Even in the Uganda
situation, the state has yet to formally challenge the admissibility of the case
against Kony et. al. despite its preparations to prosecute Kony before a special
division of its high court.
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010)
Nonetheless, the admissibility decisions to date do not necessarily coincide with
the wishes of defendants like Katanga. The current practice seems to give the
impression of a trend away from cooperation and toward competition even if the
various players at the ICC do not intend to implement complementarity such that it
tends toward supranational primacy. The mere existence of language that can be
interpreted to pose such a challenge to complementarity is in itself problematic. It
gives rise to the arguments made by Newton and Katanga, voicing concerns over
ICC hostility to state proceedings. This in turn may lead to state inaction,
overwhelming the ICC, and yielding increased impunity. Therefore, Newton's
work is particularly valuable in revealing the appearance of such a trend and
offering some nascent thoughts on how to counter this impression through
subsequent ICC practice. Newton advocates the adoption of positive
complementarity, in the form of deference to states. The above discussion of the
current practice of the ICC, in the form of statements of various arms of the ICC as
well as case law, yields several other suggestions.
For example, the ICC could refrain from discussing the same person, same
conduct test in terms that can be misinterpreted as requiring states to predict ICC
charges or to investigate/prosecute the same behavior down to the precise time,
place, and predicate act. The ICC, particularly the Office of the Prosecutor, could
avoid references to gravity that seem to elevate the gravity consideration to the
exclusion of other article 17 factors. Finally, the ICC can clarify the "unwritten"
unwillingness provision, particularly as it relates to self-referrals. It might
concomitantly emphasize its activities related to building state capacity, such as
any consultations with states like Uganda regarding domestic proceedings
acceptable under the Rome Statute. Ideally, it could promulgate standards for
deference to states, in order to enhance predictability and transparency, thereby
encouraging state action and minimizing impunity.
The implementation of a critical but undefined principle like complementarity
necessarily poses challenges for a new tribunal. Professor Newton's article
illustrates the potential concerns raised by ICC practice to date and creates an
opportunity for the ICC to respond to possible misimpressions regarding an
attitude of supranational superiority and ICC hostility toward states.
